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Abstract
Human capital theory distinguishes between training in general-usage and firm-specific skills.
In his seminal work, Becker (1964) argues that employers will not be willing to invest in
general training when labor markets are competitive. However, they are willing to invest in
specific training because it cannot be transferred to outside firms. The paper reconsiders
Becker’s theory. We show that there exists an incentive  complementarity between
employersponsored general and specific investments: the possibility to provide specific
training leads the employer to invest in general human capital. Conversely, the latter reduces
the hold-up problem that arises with respect to the provision of firm-specific training. We also
consider the virtues of long-term contracting and discuss some empirical observations that
could be explained by the model.
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Based on the transferability of the acquired skills, human capital theory distinguishes
between investments in general-usage and speciﬁc human capital. As pointed out
by Becker (1964), this distinction is important if these investments take the form of
employer-provided training. While the returns to speciﬁc training can be realized only
in an ongoing relationship with the training ﬁrm, general training increases the produc-
tivity of a worker in many ﬁrms besides those providing it. Becker’s theory separately
addresses these phenomena and draws two main conclusions. First, employers will
share the returns and the cost of investments in ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills with their employ-
ees. Second, in a competitive labor market ﬁrms will not invest into general skills
of their employees due to their inability to collect the returns from such investments.
Therefore, workers will pay the full cost of general training.
Yet, there is a range of evidence indicating that ﬁrms voluntarily bear the cost of
training, even if the acquired skills are largely general in nature. This is particularly
apparent in countries with institutionalized apprenticeship systems. In Germany, for
example, participants in the system (secondary school graduates) engage in part-time
schooling and on-the-job training and receive upon completion a nation-wide accepted
certiﬁcate that helps to make their skills marketable throughout the profession. Franz
and Soskice (1995) estimate that German employers paid a net cost per apprentice of
about DM 12.300 in 1985. Using 1991 survey data on training ﬁrms in Germany, von
Bardeleben, Beicht and Feher (1995) conclude that even under the most conservative
assumptions, the net cost of an apprentice in a larger German ﬁrm exceeds DM 7.500.1
The present paper reconsiders Becker’s seminal arguments in a framework where ﬁrms
can provide both general and speciﬁc training. To this end, we employ a simple model
that preserves two essential characteristics of the standard theory:a) the labor market
is frictionless in the sense that a worker always receives the full return from general
training and b) he obtains a share of the return from speciﬁc training. Our main result
is that employers may still voluntarily provide a positive amount of general training
or, alternatively, be willing to share the costs of such training with their employees.
As a ﬁrst step to this conclusion, we ﬁnd that general and speciﬁc investments cannot
1Interestingly, this study also estimates net training costs to be negative for small ﬁrms (see Section
3 for a discussion). For further evidence on ﬁrm-sponsored general training, see Soskice (1994) and
Harhoﬀ and Kane (1997) for Germany, and Ryan (1980) and Bishop (1991) for the U.S.
1be separately analyzed. Rather, the presence of the relationship-speciﬁc rent that is
generated through ﬁrm-speciﬁc training makes the parties’ returns from either type of
investment interdependent even if (as we posit) there is no technological link between
them. The idea of our approach can be outlined as follows. If a ﬁrm can provide only
general training, it has no incentives to invest since the employee can recover the full
return on his human capital in the absence of market imperfections. If, in contrast, the
ﬁrm can also expend investments in relationship-speciﬁc skills, this will create a wedge
between the worker’s productivity if he leaves his current employer and his productivity
if employment continues beyond the training period. Once training is completed, ﬁrm
and worker are therefore in a bilateral monopoly position.
Now suppose for example that in the ensuing wage negotiations, the surplus from con-
tinued employment is divided with the external market opportunities acting as outside
options. Then, although the (above market) rent depends only on the worker’s speciﬁc
human capital, the way in which it is shared also depends on his general skills. In par-
ticular, as long as the external market opportunity of the worker (which fully reﬂects
his marginal product from general training) is binding, negotiations will lead to the
going market wage. As a result, the rent from speciﬁc human capital accrues entirely
to the ﬁrm while it appropriates no return from the worker’s general human capital. If
this rent is suﬃciently large relative to the return on general human capital, however,
or if the worker’s bargaining power is suﬃciently high, his share of the surplus from
continued employment will be above what he can realize on the external market. As a
consequence, the worker captures part of the rent from speciﬁc skills and a ‘Hold-up’
problem [Williamson (1985), Grout (1984)] arises. While hold-up discourages speciﬁc
training, it at the same time improves the ﬁrm’s incentives to provide general training:
although external wages rise one-to-one with a worker’s productivity from general skills,
the wage he obtains if he stays with the training ﬁrm rises by less than that if surplus
sharing (hold-up) occurs.
A number of results follow immediately from this observation. First, the higher the
level of speciﬁc training, the larger the resulting gap and, hence, the more incentives
the ﬁrm has to to invest into general training. Second, the reverse also holds, i.e., gen-
eral skills enhance the ﬁrm’s provision of speciﬁc training relative to a scenario where
general training is not taken into consideration. This is because in situations where a
worker’s outside wage is binding for given investment levels, the employer reaps the full
return from speciﬁc investments on the margin because each worker’s equilibrium wage
2then coincides with his marginal product from general training. As a consequence, her
investment incentives in speciﬁc training increase as compared to a setting without gen-
eral training where the worker’s outside wage poses a weaker constraint in bargaining.
Hence, general and speciﬁc human capital are complementary from the ﬁrm’s point of
view even if their returns (and provision costs) are technologically disconnected. For
this reason, we also ﬁnd that the parties will agree on a general training level in excess
of the ﬁrst best if this investment can be contracted upon in advance. Since general
and speciﬁc training are complements, a higher level of general training stimulates the
provision of speciﬁc investments, and thus further alleviates the hold-up problem that
arises when speciﬁc training is non-contractible. Finally, we argue that extending our
framework to allow for (equilibrium) turnover, the possibility of long-term contractual
arrangements, or more general bargaining solutions qualitatively leaves these conclu-
sions unaﬀected.
The present paper is related to several contributions in the literature. First, we adopt
our theoretical approach from previous work on speciﬁc investments and the hold-up
problem.2 In particular, our analysis draws on MacLeod and Malcomson (1993a, 1995)
who provide a natural framework to study both general and speciﬁc investments in
bilateral trade relationships. To formalize how the rent generated through speciﬁc
investments is shared among the parties, the authors develop a bargaining game where
negotiation and trade takes place over time, which reﬂects the long-term nature of
employment relationships well. The equilibrium outcome follows the outside option
principle, which we adopt for analytical simplicity.3 As we will see below, however, this
solution is not necessary for our ﬁndings. MacLeod and Malcomson (1993a, 1993b) use
this model to investigate under which conditions simple contractual arrangements can
induce eﬃcient investments. In particular, it is shown that a long-term contract which
speciﬁes a ﬁxed price (wage) and possibly in addition a fee paid in case of termination
(a redundancy payment) will induce one party to expend eﬃcient speciﬁc investments,
even if those also beneﬁt the other party as is the case with ﬁrm-sponsored speciﬁc
training. They do not consider a situation where the ﬁrm provides general training,
which is the focus of our analysis.4
2See among others, Grout (1984), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Edlin
and Reichelstein (1996).
3This principle has been derived in a version of the Rubinstein game where at least one party can
take an outside option [Shaked and Sutton (1984)] and states that outside options act as a lower bound
to a party’s payoﬀs in negotiations but otherwise do not aﬀect the outcome.
4MacLeod and Malcomson (1993a) also study general investments by both agents but these are
3Second, a number of recent papers analyze human capital accumulation in the con-
text of employment relationships and propose several reasons for why we observe ﬁrm-
sponsored general training. This literature mainly focuses on general training and
disregards speciﬁc investments. One prominent explanation is based on asymmetric
information between the training ﬁrm and potential future employees. Katz and Zider-
man (1990) suggest that the ﬁrm may be willing to invest in a worker’s general skills if
his level of training is unobserved by the market.5 Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) study
a model where the training ﬁrm obtains superior information on the worker’s ability
during the training period. The informational disadvantage of ﬁrms in the external
labor market gives rise to adverse selection, i.e., the equilibrium market wage falls short
of the marginal product of highly skilled workers. As a result, a training ﬁrm enjoys
some monopsony power over its workers and is able to capture (part of) the return
from general training. A similar situation arises if general skills are only valuable in
a small number of ﬁrms [Stevens (1994), Gersbach and Schmutzler (2001)] or if there
are search costs associated with ﬁnding alternative employers [Acemoglu (1997)]. Ace-
moglu and Pischke (1999) motivate the prevalence of employer-ﬁnanced general training
by the existence of market frictions that compress the structure of wages in the sense
that the outside wage falls short of the marginal product from general skills and this
wedge increases in the level of training provided. The authors show that such wage
compression can endogenously emerge in economies with minimum wages, wage-setting
unions, or worker moral hazard. Finally, they note that ﬁrm-sponsored investments in
general training is encouraged if general and speciﬁc skills are complements in a ﬁrm’s
production function. A related argument has been put forward by Franz and Soskice
(1995) who recognize that employers may provide general training if general and speciﬁc
investments are complements in the ﬁrm’s investment cost function.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 develops the basic model
with general and speciﬁc investments which is analyzed in Section 2.2. The following
Section 2.3. brieﬂy considers the implications of labor turnover and the possibility of
long-term contracting. In Section 3 we discuss our results and their implications and
relate them to empirical evidence. A ﬁnal Section 4 concludes.
‘selﬁsh’ in the sense that they do not aﬀect the external market opportunity of the other party.
5See also Chiang and Chiang (1990) and Chang and Wang (1996).
42 A Model of General and Speciﬁc Training
2.1 The Basic Framework
Consider the following simple model of human capital accumulation in the labor market.
There are two risk-neutral parties:a worker and a ﬁrm operating in a competitive labor
market.6 Time is divided into a training period t = 1 and a subsequent employment
period t = 2 and there is no discounting. In period t, the worker produces an output of
vt, measured in monetary terms, and receives a wage wt. Without loss of generality, we
normalize his disutility from work to zero. In the ﬁrst period, the worker is unskilled
but may be trained by the ﬁrm in both general and ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills. The ﬁrm’s total
outlays for general and speciﬁc training are denoted by g ∈ [0, ¯ g] ⊂ IR a n d s ∈ [0, ¯ s] ⊂ IR ,
respectively. Throughout the analysis, we assume that the amount of speciﬁc on-the-job
training s cannot be contractually speciﬁed. Training in general skills g, in contrast,
may or may not be contractible, depending for example on whether there is a formal
apprenticeship program in which the parties participate or not.
For simplicity, we let the productivity of an unskilled worker in t = 1 be independent
of the amount of training he receives and be equal to v1 = v1 ≥ 0. The output v2
of a skilled worker in t = 2 is determined by the ﬁrm’s investments in general and
speciﬁc training, g and s, as well as a random parameter θ which may be interpreted
as the worker’s ability or as an industry-wide shock that aﬀects market conditions. θ
becomes known to both parties after the ﬁrst period and is distributed according to
a continuously diﬀerentiable distribution function F(θ) over a bounded support [θ, ¯ θ].
Let σ =( s,g,θ) ∈ Σb et h es t a t eo ft h ew o r l di nt = 2. To make our point as strong as
possible, we disregard in what follows the possibility of technological complementarities
between general and speciﬁc training. Thus, the productivity of a skilled worker is
additively separable in g and s,
v2(s,g,θ)=v
S(s,θ)+v
G(g,θ), ∀ σ ∈ Σ( 1 )
where vS and vG are the components of v2 that can be attributed to the acquisition of
ﬁrm speciﬁc and general skills, respectively.
6Restricting attention to a single worker-ﬁrm pair is done for expositional convenience only and
inconsequential for the results that follow. It is formally justiﬁed if there is a suﬃciently large number
of ﬁrms in the market and all ﬁrms have access to the same technology that is linear in the number
of workers they employ. Risk-neutrality helps us to abstract from insurance considerations that would
unnecessarily complicate the analysis [see Rosen (1994) for a survey on this issue].
5Assumption 1. The function v2(·) is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly concave and
increasing in (s,g). Furthermore, for all σ ∈ Σ,
a) limi→0 ∂v2(s,g,θ)/∂i = ∞ and limi→¯ i ∂v2(s,g,θ)/∂i =0 , i ∈{ s,g},
b) infσ v2(s,g,θ)=v2 ≥ 0a n dv2(0,g,θ)=vG(g,θ).
Part a) of Assumption 1 implies that it is always socially optimal to have a posi-
tive amount of either type of training. Part b) ensures that subsequent employment
(whether with the current employer or with another ﬁrm on the external labor market)
is always eﬃcient. Moreover, in the absence of speciﬁc investments, all productivity
is general in nature. Given the state σ at the beginning of period 2, worker and ﬁrm
negotiate on the second-period wage in a way to be detailed below. Both parties are
free to terminate their relationship at that time, i.e., the worker may decide to quit or
the ﬁrm may decide to lay the worker oﬀ. In either case, the parties have access to
the external labor market. The wage determined in this market is denoted by wE.B y
deﬁnition, the worker’s general skills are perfectly marketable while his speciﬁc skills
loose their value in case of a separation. Thus, another ﬁrm hiring the worker (or the
ﬁrm hiring another skilled worker) would value his output at vG(g,θ).
Assumption 2. There is perfect competition on the external labor market in both
periods and the state σ =( s,g,θ) is commonly observable. Hence, wE = vG(g,θ) for
all σ ∈ Σ.
The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 1. In stage 0, the ﬁrm oﬀers a wage
contract w1 to the worker that governs the training period. If feasible, the contract
may also specify how much training in general skills g he is to receive. Once hired the
worker produces v1, and the ﬁrm decides in stage 1 on training outlays s and g.I n
stage 2, ﬁrst period payoﬀs π1 = v1 −w1 −s−g and u1 = w1 are realized. The random
parameter θ (e.g., the worker’s ability) becomes known in stage 3. The second-period
wage w2 is negotiated in stage 4. If employment continues, the worker produces v2 and
the parties’ second-period payoﬀs are π2 = v2 − w2 and u2 = w2. If the relationship is
terminated, either party can take up its external market opportunity. The payoﬀs in
this case are denoted by uE and πE, respectively.
For future reference, let us brieﬂy calculate the eﬃcient levels of training. To this end,
recall that by Assumption 1, the worker should be hired in t = 1 and continued to
6✲
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Figure 1:Sequence of Events
be employed by the ﬁrm in t = 2, irrespective of its training outlays s and g.7 The
ﬁrst-best amount of training each worker receives is thus uniquely deﬁned by
(s
FB,g




[v2(s,g,θ)]dF(θ)+v1 − s − g.











equating the expected marginal return from each type of training with its marginal
cost. As one would expect, gFB and sFB are determined independently from each other
due to the separability of v2(·).
It remains to describe the outcome of the negotiations between the ﬁrm and a worker
on the second-period wage w2. Recall that those take place under symmetric informa-
tion since the state is known to both parties in stage 4. Clearly, if an agreement is
reached and the relationship continues, the net surplus to be divided in negotiations is
equal to second period net production v2 ≥ 0. However, each party can terminate the
relationship and take up its external market opportunity in which case the payoﬀ to the
ﬁrm and the worker is πE and uE, respectively. In the subsequent formal analysis, we
assume for concreteness that negotiations can be formalized by a bargaining solution
which ensures eﬃciency and is characterized by the outside option principle. How our
results generalize to other bargaining solutions is discussed in Section 3 below.
7The assumption that the worker should always stay with the training ﬁrm will be relaxed in Section
2.3. below which addresses the possibility of eﬃcient separation in t =2 .
7Assumption 3. Let α ∈ (0,1) be a parameter that measures the relative bargaining
power of the worker. The second period equilibrium payoﬀs π∗
2 and u∗
2 in the negotiation
game are unique and satisfy π∗
2 + u∗











(1 − α)v2(·) for (1 − α)v2(·) ≥ πE
πE otherwise.
Thus, worker and ﬁrm share the surplus from continued employment according to their
relative bargaining power with their external market opportunities acting as an outside
option, i.e., they constitute a lower bound on each party’s payoﬀ but otherwise do
not aﬀect the outcome. This formulation is consistent with several extensive-form
bargaining games that have been developed in the context of labor markets [Shaked and
Sutton (1984), MacLeod and Malcomson (1993a, 1995)].8 It can further be simpliﬁed
by noting that πE = 0 because competition on the external labor market ensures
that the ﬁrm hiring another worker always has to pay him his full marginal product
[Assumption 2]. Due to v2(·) ≥ 0 [Assumption 1], the ﬁrm’s share of the surplus from
continued employment always weakly exceeds the proﬁt from taking up its external
market opportunity. We can thus disregard the ﬁrm’s outside option in what follows
and characterize the negotiation outcome in terms of the second period equilibrium
wage w∗





αv2(·) for αv2(·) ≥ wE
wE otherwise.
(4)
Two characteristics of w∗
2 are notable. First, the employee always receives at least his
marginal product from general skills, wE = vG(g,θ). Second, if the worker prefers his
equilibrium wage in the absence of an outside opportunity to the wage he can obtain
in the external labor market, the latter does not inﬂuence the bargaining outcome
8More speciﬁcally, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game studied by Shaked and
Sutton (which is based on the Rubinstein bargaining game) coincides in the limit were discounting is
negligible with the outcome in Assumption 3 for α =1 /2. Arbitrary values of α can be introduced
into the alternating-oﬀers game by assuming that nature chooses which player makes an oﬀer in each
bargaining round with constant probability [see Binmore (1987)]. Using this variant of the Rubinstein
game, MacLeod and Malcomson (1993a, 1995) develop a model of contract (re-)negotiation where
trade occurs over time rather than at a single date, thus reﬂecting the long-term nature of employment
relationships very well. Under our speciﬁcation (and assuming that the worker strictly prefers not to
work in the absence of a contract, i.e., a zero wage), the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in their
model if the time interval between oﬀers vanishes again coincides with the outcome in Assumption 3.
8(outside option principle). As the literature on non-cooperative bargaining has shown,
this property will prevail if a quit (or layoﬀ) eﬀectively terminates the negotiations and
forgoes all future gains from cooperation so that the worker cannot credibly threaten
to quit in such a situation.9
General Investments in Human Capital
Let us ﬁrst investigate a situation where the ﬁrm cannot or does not invest into relation-
ship speciﬁc skills of the worker by setting s ≡ 0. Because all training is then general,
the employee is as valuable inside the existing relationship as on the external labor mar-
ket. Hence, competition among ﬁrms ensures that the worker is paid his full marginal
product vG(g,θ), irrespective of whether the relationship is continued or the worker
seeks outside employment. By (4), negotiations will lead to a second-period wage of
w∗
2 = wE:surplus sharing never occurs simply because there is no rent in excess of what
can be obtained in the market. The ﬁrm’s second period proﬁt is thus π∗
2 =0a n dt h e
worker’s utility is u∗
2 = v2(0,g,θ)=vG(g,θ). The expected overall returns from the re-
lationship are then given by E[π(0,g)] = v1−w1−g and E[u(0,g)] = w1+Eθ[vG(g,θ)],
respectively. The following proposition is immediate and replicates Becker’s (1964)
seminal argument.
Proposition 1. Suppose the ﬁrm does not invest into speciﬁc skills of the employee,
i.e., s ≡ 0. Then, the equilibrium level of general training g∗ and the ﬁrst period wage
w∗
1 satisfy
a) g∗ =0and w∗
1 = v1 if g cannot be contracted upon,
b) g∗ = gFB, and w∗
1 = v1 − gFB,i fg is contractible.
The employer never pays for training in general skills because she cannot recover any
returns from such training in the second period. If its training expenditures are non-
contractible, this implies that no general human capital investments are made in equi-
librium. Likewise, if g is contractible and the ﬁrm can oﬀer initial contracts (w1,g),
any outlays in general training have to be borne entirely by the employee by receiving
a ﬁrst-period wage below his productivity. Expressed diﬀerently, if we let γ be the
worker’s cost share and express the ﬁrst-period wage as w∗
1 =¯ w1 − γg where ¯ w1 is the
wage component that is independent of g,t h e n¯ w1 = v1 and γ = 1:the worker is paid
9See, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein (1990). Malcomson (1997) provides an extensive discussion of
how market opportunities can enter the negotiation outcome and when they take the form of outside
options. This point is discussed in more detail in Section 3.
9his ﬁrst-period marginal product and ﬁnances the full cost of his training out of his
pay.10
2.2 Investment in General and Speciﬁc Training
We now return to the possibility of investment in the acquisition of ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills.
To see how training in ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills alters equilibrium characteristics, reconsider
the outcome of negotiations on second-period wage contracts. For s>0, there is
now a positive rent v2(s,g,θ) − wE = v2(s,g,θ) − vG(g,θ)=vS(s,θ) > 0 to be divided
between worker and ﬁrm. While this rent depends solely on the level of speciﬁc training
s, the way in which it is shared depends also on g as can be seen from (4). For
αv2 <w E ⇔ vS <v G(1 − α)/α, the worker’s share of the surplus generated in the
existing relationship falls short of what he can obtain on the external labor market:
since his alternative market opportunity is binding, the negotiated second period wage
is w∗
2 = wE = vG(g,θ) and the rent from speciﬁc investments vS(·) accrues entirely to
the ﬁrm.
Conversely, the negotiated wage exceeds the outside market wage for αv2 ≥ wE ⇔
vS ≥ vG(1 − α)/α. In those states, the worker captures part of the rent generated
through speciﬁc human capital accumulation through his share α of the overall surplus.
His equilibrium wage then satisﬁes w∗
2 >w E = vG(g,θ). As already noted by Becker,
speciﬁc training investments imply that worker and ﬁrm are in a bilateral monopoly
position after those investments have been made:if the worker quits and takes on
another job, the ﬁrm’s expenditures are wasted because no replacement worker would be
equally proﬁcient in the required task. Similarly, the speciﬁc skills are not marketable if
the worker is laid oﬀ and he would therefore be unable to recoup any speciﬁc investments
on this own part. As is well known, once worker and ﬁrm share the rent from speciﬁc
investments, the ‘Hold-up Problem’ [Williamson (1985), Grout (1984)] arises and the
ﬁrm will underinvest. The crucial point to recognize, however, is that the ﬁrm’s hold-
up with respect to its speciﬁc investments is beneﬁcial with respect to its incentives
to invest into general skills:whenever the worker receives part of the surplus from the
ﬁrm’s expenditures on speciﬁc training, the ﬁrm at the same time captures part of the
10The proposition implicitly requires that the worker is not liquidity constrained, e.g., he can borrow
against future wage income. Otherwise, although we still had w∗
1 = v1 − g∗, it may be the case that
g∗ <g FB if the worker might not be able to ﬁnance g = gFB out of his ﬁrst-period pay (his productivity
during the training period is suﬃciently low).
10return on general training.
Formally, let Θ(s,g)={θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ]:vS(s,θ) ≥ vG(g,θ)(1 − α)/α} denote the set of
states in which rent sharing occurs for given investments (s,g). Inserting the expression
for w∗
2 from (4) into the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt from the relationship, the latter can be
written as











dF(θ) − g − s. (5)
Let us ﬁrst focus on a situation where g is not contractible so that the employer would
not be willing to provide general training for s ≡ 0. If speciﬁc investments are allowed
for, the ﬁrm chooses (s,g) so as to maximize (5), subject to the non-negativity con-
straints g ≥ 0a n ds ≥ 0. As is easily seen, the latter constraint is never binding and can
be ignored. Substituting for v2(s,g,θ)=vS(s,θ)+vG(g,θ), the ﬁrst-order conditions

















dF(θ) ≤ 1, = 1 for g
∗ > 0, (7)
where Θ(·) is evaluated at (s∗,g∗).11 Hence,
Proposition 2. Suppose the ﬁrm can train the worker in speciﬁc and general skills
and training expenditures are non-contractible. Then, its equilibrium training outlays
(s∗,g∗) are characterized by
a) s∗ <s FB and 0 <g ∗ <g FB if vS(sFB,θ) >v 2
1−α
α for some realization of θ ∈ [θ,θ],
b) s∗ = sFB and g∗ =0otherwise.
Thus, the ﬁrm invests in general training if and only if hold-up with respect to speciﬁc
training occurs with positive probability.
11It is straightforward to verify that E[π(s,g)] is concave in (s,g). Equilibrium training outlays
(s∗,g∗) are therefore unique and fully determined by (6) and (7). Also note that small changes in
training outlays that aﬀect the set of states in which surplus-sharing occurs do not enter the ﬁrst-order
conditions by deﬁnition of Θ(·) and continuity of F(θ).
11Under our assumptions on v2(·), the claim follows directly by comparing (6) with (2)
and by inspection of (7). A formal proof is therefore omitted. The intuition for this
ﬁnding has already been laid out in the preceding discussion. If hold-up occurs in
some states of the word, the employee captures a fraction α of the surplus from the
ﬁrm’s expenditures in his acquisition of speciﬁc (as well as general) skills. At the
same time, however, the ﬁrm is also able to recover part of its expenditures on general
training on the margin. This is true even though rent sharing implies that the ﬁrm’s
overall proﬁt from both types of training decreases relative to a situation where the
employee’s alternative market opportunity is binding. Expressed diﬀerently, the ﬁrm
captures part of the return from its general training outlays although the worker always
receives at least his marginal product from general training.12 Hold-up with respect to
speciﬁc investments (s∗ <s FB) can only be avoided if, given eﬃcient speciﬁc and no
general training, the external wage of a worker with no marketable skills, wE = v2,i s
suﬃciently high so as to make his outside market opportunity binding in every state
of the world, i.e., Θ(sFB,0) = ∅,o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,vS(sFB,θ) ≤ v2
1−α
α for all realizations
of θ. Otherwise, however, hold-up will occur and it is optimal for the employer to
provide a positive amount of general training. Finally, note that since s∗ > 0, the
ﬁrm expects to realize a positive second-period proﬁt. On a competitive labor market,
those future proﬁts will be competed away by means of ﬁrst-period wage payments.
Formally, we have E[π(s∗,g∗,θ)] = 0 ⇒ w∗
1 >v 1, i.e., the ﬁrm’s rents from human
capital accumulation are appropriated by the worker through a rise in his ﬁrst period
wage.
At ﬁrst glance, the statement in Proposition 2 may lead one to conclude that a ﬁrm’s
investment in general human capital negatively distorts the accumulation of speciﬁc
human capital relative to a situation where general training is absent, g ≡ 0. The
following result asserts that this conclusion is misleading:
Proposition 3. The ﬁrm’s expected-proﬁt function (5) is supermodular in s and g.
Therefore, general and speciﬁc training are complementary from the ﬁrm’s point of
viewand its optimal investments into speciﬁc human capital s∗(g) are nondecreasing in
the level of general human capital g (and vice versa).
Proof. See the Appendix.
12It is important to observe that this property of our model diﬀers from the existing literature where
wages are ‘compressed’ and workers receive less than the marginal productivity associated with their













Intuitively, employees with a high level of general training receive higher external wage
oﬀers than those with fewer or no general skills. The outside market opportunity of
workers with more general training will therefore bind more frequently, ceteris paribus.
Although the ﬁrm has to match the external wage in those states, it at the same
time reaps the full marginal return from its speciﬁc training outlays (rent sharing does
not occur) and its incentives to provide speciﬁc training rise. In other words, general
training alleviates the hold-up problem that arises from the parties’ lock-in in a bilateral
monopoly situation.
Figure 2 illustrates the above arguments. It depicts the ﬁrm’s optimally chosen expen-
ditures in speciﬁc training s∗ (respectively, general training g∗) as a function of a given
level of g (respectively, s). If the worker had no general training, the ﬁrm would provide
speciﬁc training of s∗(0) = smin which solves (6), evaluated at Θ(smin,0). The speciﬁc
training outlays s∗(g) increase thereafter until g is suﬃciently high that surplus sharing
no longer occurs so that the ﬁrm invests eﬃciently, independent of g. Conversely, no
general training would be provided if s = 0 and this continues to be optimal up to some
s = s  at which point surplus sharing occurs with positive probability, i.e., Θ(s,0) is
non-empty for s ≥ s . ¿From then on, the provision of general training g∗(s)i n c r e a s e s
because the likelihood of a surplus sharing outcome increases in s, ceteris paribus. If
13this probability is equal to one, g∗ is maximal and given by gmax <g FB which solves
(7) for Θ = [θ, ¯ θ]. The equilibrium outlays (s∗,g∗) characterized in Proposition 2 can
be found at the intersection of both curves. As long as smin <s FB ⇔ Θ(sFB,0)  = ∅,
the intersection point is characterized by g∗ > 0. Otherwise, we have smin = sFB which
implies s  >s FB by deﬁnition of s  so that the curves intersect on the axis where g∗ =0 .
Also note that the eﬀect of a drop in the worker’s bargaining power does not necessar-
ily encourage ﬁrm-sponsored general training:a reduction in α reduces the probability
that surplus sharing occurs, thus shifting s∗(g)u p w a r d s .S i n c eg∗(s) also shifts upwards
by the same token, however, the composite eﬀect is ambiguous.
Let us now turn to the case where g is contractible so that the ﬁrm can oﬀer an initial
contract (w1,g). For a precontracted level of general training g, the ﬁrm’s expenditures
on speciﬁc training s∗(g) are determined by (6) and its associated expected proﬁt is (5)
evaluated at (s∗(g),g). Consider a ﬁrst-period contract that involves g = gFB.F r o m
our previous analysis, we already know that the share of general training outlays borne
by the worker is strictly less than one if Θ(s∗(gFB),gFB) is non-empty. This condition








for some θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ]. (8)
The argument here is essentially the same as in Proposition 2. If hold-up with respect
to speciﬁc training prevails, the ﬁrm captures part of the surplus from general training
and is therefore willing to bear a positive share of those expenses. In this case, though,
the equilibrium contract does not prescribe a ﬁrst-best amount of general training:
Proposition 4. Suppose the ﬁrm can train the worker in general and speciﬁc skills
and the amount of general training can be contracted upon. If (8) holds, equilibrium
training outlays satisfy s∗ <s FB and g∗ >g FB. In this case, the worker does not bear
the full cost of his general training. Otherwise, (s∗,g∗)=( sFB,gFB) and the worker’s
share of general training expenditures is equal to one.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result states that worker and ﬁrm do not necessarily agree on the ﬁrst-best level
of g even though such a contract is feasible.13 Rather, they may well decide on a in-
13Again, a contract prescribing g∗ ≥ gFB may not be feasible if the employee is wealth constrained.
Note, however, that the presence of speciﬁc training facilitates an agreement on g because the ﬁrm’s
second-period rent generated by the worker’s speciﬁc skills raises ﬁrst period wages, thereby relaxing
his liquidity constraint.
14eﬃciently high provision of general training. Although perhaps surprising, this ﬁnding
is easily explained:suppose at a precontracted level of general training gFB, the ﬁrm’s
(unilaterally chosen) expenditures on training in speciﬁc skills fall short of sFB.O b v i -
ously, a small increase in g above gFB has only a second order eﬀect on the returns to
general training. Since general and speciﬁc training are complementary from the ﬁrm’s
point of view by Proposition 3, however, it improves the ﬁrm’s incentives to engage in
speciﬁc training. But raising g has a positive ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the joint surplus from
speciﬁc human capital accumulation. Thus, the worker optimally receives ‘too much’
general training in order to reduce a prevailing hold-up problem with respect to the
ﬁrm’s speciﬁc human capital investments.14
Before concluding this section, let us brieﬂy indicate how the above results change if
it is instead the worker who decides how much to invest in his general skills, while
the ﬁrm decides on how much speciﬁc training training he is to receive. First, it is
immediate that the outcome remains unaﬀected in a situation where g is contractible.
Since the contractually agreed upon level of g is always chosen so as to maximize joint
surplus, (residual) decision rights do not matter and Proposition 4 continues to hold.
Next, recall that in the absence of speciﬁc training (s ≡ 0), the worker receives the
full marginal product from his general skills and would therefore invest eﬃciently even
if g cannot be contracted upon. Clearly, this argument carries over to the case where
the ﬁrm invests in s but the employee’s outside option is binding, i.e., surplus sharing
never occurs. Otherwise, however, surplus sharing implies that he does not capture
the full return from his investments at the margin and, as a result, underinvests. The
outcome if g is non-contractible and chosen by the worker thus inversely mirrors the
result in Proposition 3. The equilibrium level of general training is eﬃcient if hold-
up with respect to speciﬁc training does not occur with positive probability [the set
Θ(sFB,gFB) is empty] and ineﬃciently low (but positive) otherwise.
2.3 Extensions
This section brieﬂy considers two natural extensions of the basic model:the possibility
of (equilibrium) labor turnover and the implications of long-term contracts.
14Contrary to what has sometimes been suggested, complaints about German apprentices spending
‘excessive’ time in vocational schools may therefore be unjustiﬁed.
15Layoﬀs and Quits
In our previous discussion, there was no reason for a ﬁrm to lay oﬀ workers or for
employees to quit their jobs:the joint surplus in an ongoing relationship always ex-
ceeded the corresponding surplus after separation due to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills of the
employee.15 Firm and worker therefore could always ﬁnd a second-period wage scheme
that made a continuation proﬁtable for both parties. The possibility of equilibrium
labor turnover can be incorporated into our basic model in a simple way. Suppose that
in addition to the employee-speciﬁc (or industry-wide) shock θ, there is another purely
match-speciﬁc shock λ ≥ 0 that is observed by both parties and positively aﬀects the
parties’ payoﬀ if they terminate the relationship and take up their outside market oppor-
tunities in period 2. For example, the worker may learn that he dislikes his colleagues
or that his spouse has found employment in another state. Alternatively, the ﬁrm may
discover that the worker is unable to adapt to its corporate culture. Irrespective of
which party experiences the shock λ, separation in t = 2 is then eﬃcient if and only
v2(s,g,θ) <w E + λ or, equivalently, vS(s,θ) <λafter using (1) and wE = vG(g,θ). In
such a situation, ﬁrm and worker can do no better than taking up their respective out-
side opportunities, i.e., the worker optimally quits or is laid oﬀ, respectively. In states
where vS(s,θ) ≥ λ so that continuation is eﬃcient, the outcome of wage negotiations
as described in Assumption 3 remains valid with πE or uE adjusted for λ. Clearly,
the external market opportunities will bind more often, thereby reducing the likelihood
of a rent-sharing outcome. By our previous arguments, the amount of general train-
ing that the ﬁrm is willing to provide on its own account in equilibrium will thus be
lower, ceteris paribus.16 As long as the ﬁrm’s speciﬁc investments are suﬃciently high
so that rent-sharing (hold-up) occurs with positive probability, however, we still have
g∗ > 0. Finally, note that the eﬀect of λ on the ﬁrm’s equilibrium outlays in speciﬁc
training is ambiguous. On the one hand, the return from speciﬁc training falls if the
relationship is terminated with positive probability since speciﬁc skills are valued only
within an existing match. On the other hand, the ﬁrm has to share the rent from its
speciﬁc investments less frequently because the likelihood that surplus-sharing occurs
is reduced.
15Recall from Assumption 1 that v2(s,g,θ) is increasing in s and v(0,g,θ)=vG(g,θ), ∀g,θ.
16As is easily seen, the ﬁrst-best general training outlays gFB are unaﬀected by the possibility of
eﬃcient separation because general skills increase the value of a worker irrespective of whether he stays
with his current employer or not.
16Long-term Contracts
Since employment contracts frequently expand beyond a short time horizon, it is im-
portant to study long-term arrangements and their eﬀects on the formation of human
capital.17 For concreteness, let us consider long-term contracts oﬀered in stage 0 that
take the form (w1,w 2), specifying a ﬁxed wage wt if the worker is employed in period t.
Also, let us for the moment suppose that the initial contract cannot be renegotiated,
and let us conﬁne attention to the case where separation is never eﬃcient, i.e., em-
ployment should always continue beyond the training period. Consider a second period
wage
0 ≤ w2 ≤ infθ v2(s
FB,g
FB,θ) (C1)
so that continued employment in t = 2 would be preferred by both, given the ﬁrm
invested eﬃciently. If the parties ex ante sign a second-period wage from that inter-
val and the worker can be prevented from taking his outside market opportunity, the
ﬁrm becomes residual claimant for the return from both types of training and, as a
consequence, chooses eﬃcient training. However, in presence of outside opportunities
a contract (w1,w 2) satisfying (C1) is not suﬃcient to ensure ﬁrst-best investments:as
long as employment is on an at-will basis, the worker could still take up his external
market opportunity in t = 2 and would optimally do so whenever wE >w 2.S i n c et h e
return from both general and speciﬁc training is lost for the ﬁrm if the worker quits, it
would underinvest (see below).
There is a simple remedy to this problem. Suppose that the contract can (in addition to
wt) stipulate a breach penalty P paid by the worker to the ﬁrm that becomes due once
the employee quits and switches to an outside employer at the beginning of the post-
training period. A suﬃciently high penalty could – if enforceable – then serve to protect
the ﬁrm’s training outlays. In particular, for a breach penalty P ≥ supθ vG(gFB,θ) −
w2, the worker never takes up outside employment because the ﬁne he would have
to pay in this case exceeds the highest possible external market wage (provided his
general training does not exceed gFB).18 As long as the ﬁxed wage w2 satisﬁes (C1),
the ﬁrm obtains the full return from its investments on the margin. Moreover, the
ﬁrst-period wage w1 can be adjusted to ensure non-negative proﬁts. The ﬁrm would
thus invest eﬃciently both in general and speciﬁc skills. In view of their simplicity
17See Malcomson (1997) for a comprehensive survey.
18This reasoning requires the legal system to allow for such penalties in employment contracts. Also,
the worker must be able to pay the penalty if necessary.
17and apparent advantages, one might thus ask why such breach penalties are rarely
observed in employment relationships where training is likely to play an important
role. One obvious reason is that courts are reluctant to enforce breach penalties that
de facto represent an exclusive dealing clause, thereby eroding the at-will nature of
employment contracts. This will be particularly so if the breach remedy P necessary
to ensure eﬃcient investments is much larger than the actual damage the ﬁrm incurs
from breach [Malcomson (1997)]. Another more fundamental explanation may be that
for the penalty to be eﬀective, it must be contingent on the identity of the breaching
party. If P had to be paid irrespective of who was responsible for separation, the ﬁrm
would become eligible for the payment if it took a unilateral action, i.e., dismissed the
employee. As a result, the worker would be (ineﬃciently) laid oﬀ in some states and the
ﬁrm would underinvest. But it may be quite impossible for an outsider to determine
who was responsible for the termination of the relationship, e.g., quits and layoﬀs may
be indistinguishable.
If (contingent) breach penalties are not enforceable, it is less straightforward to achieve
eﬃcient investments. To see this, note that for the ﬁrm never to lay the worker oﬀ,
the initially agreed upon second period wage must satisfy w2 ≤ infθ v2(sFB,gFB,θ).
Similarly, for the worker never to quit, we must have w2 ≥ supθ vG(gFB,θ). Taken
together, these two inequalities can only hold if
infθ v2(s
FB,g
FB,θ) ≥ supθ v
G(g
FB,θ), (C2)
i.e., the smallest conceivable surplus inside the relationship must exceed the highest
conceivable wage on the external labor market, given eﬃcient investments.19 As long
as there is some uncertainty in second-period productivity of a skilled worker, (C2) is
quite restrictive:the diﬃculty lies in the fact that (eﬃcient) voluntary continuation of
the relationship has to be ensured, i.e., it must be possible to ﬁnd the ﬁxed second-
period wage such that a quit or a layoﬀ is never unilaterally optimal for either party.20
19Condition (C2) must also hold if the initial contract comprises a (redundancy) payment p which
becomes eﬀective in case of separation (and is independent of who is responsible for separation to
occur). To see this, observe that the relevant inequalities are then p ≤ infθ v2(sFB,gFB,θ) − w2 and
w2 ≥ supvG(gFB,θ) − p, again implying (C2).
20Of course, the parties may renegotiate the initial contract instead of terminating their their rela-
tionship if separation is not eﬃcient. A discussion of this issue can be found in Kessler and L¨ ulfesmann
(2000), which draws on the work of MacLeod and Malcomson (1993a, 1995). If g is not contractible,
renegotiations further impede the possibility of inducing eﬃcient training, at least under the simple
contractual arrangements we consider. If g is contractible, however, long-term schemes with (non-
contingent) termination payment generically implement eﬃcient speciﬁc investments [those can be
determined along the lines of MacLeod and Malcomson (1993a), see Proposition 7 in their paper].
18Finally, observe that eﬃcient ﬁrm-sponsored general training is even more diﬃcult
to achieve if it may be optimal for the parties to separate. Intuitively, if the worker
(eﬃciently) quits, the training ﬁrm does not recover any surplus from its general invest-
ments. Since it does not take into account the positive externality general investments
have on the worker’s outside productivity, underinvestment prevails. This argument
holds even if contingent breach penalties are feasible:if the fee is small so that the
worker quits in spite of the penalty, the employer obtains no return from her general
investments. Conversely, if the fee is large so eﬃcient separation requires renegotiation,
the employer appropriates only a fraction of the marginal returns from training invest-
ments as long as the worker has some bargaining power. Again, the ﬁrm does not fully
internalize the externality generated by its training outlays.21
3 Discussion
In his seminal work, Becker (1964) drew the important distinction between general and
speciﬁc investments in human capital. If the skills a worker acquires through on-the-
job training are purely general, he argued, the wage on the external labor market will
reﬂect the full marginal product from this training. Thus, workers capture the entire
return from their general human capital in a competitive labor market. Conversely,
training in perfectly speciﬁc skills has no eﬀect on the worker’s productivity in other
ﬁrms and the wage that an employee could get elsewhere would thus be independent
of the amount of training he received. As a consequence, the return to speciﬁc human
capital is shared between employees and ﬁrms. Becker concluded that employees must
bear all the costs of their general training whereas the costs of speciﬁc training are
shared between workers and ﬁrms.22 As noted earlier, however, the ﬁrst prediction is
at odds with empirical work on ﬁrm-sponsored formal training programs whose content
is general in nature. The present framework reconciles Becker’s theory with empirical
evidence in a framework that preserves its two main characteristics:a) the worker
always receives the full return from general training and b) obtains a share of the
return (rent) generated by speciﬁc training. The sole diﬀerence lies in the fact that
we do not consider each type of human capital investment separately but rather allow
21In a model with labor market frictions, Acemoglu (1997) shows that this result even applies when
general investments are contractible.
22For a formal analysis on how the costs of speciﬁc investments are shared, see Hashimoto (1981).
19for both general and speciﬁc training to be provided at the same time.23 Once this
possibility is taken into account, the sharp conclusion that ﬁrms should never pay for
investments in general training no longer applies. Moreover, this result does not rely on
general and speciﬁc skills being complements in production (or training expenditures)
as the previous analysis has shown.
A body of recent research has suggested several reasons of why and under which cir-
cumstances ﬁrms may be willing to contribute to the costs of general training. One
prominent explanation is based on informational asymmetries between the training ﬁrm
and potential future employers.24 If the outside market is not as well informed as the
current employer about a worker’s level of training or his other relevant characteristics,
the worker’s general skills are no longer perfectly marketable and in essence become
speciﬁc skills. An analogous line of reasoning applies if there are labor market frictions
created by search or hiring costs [Acemoglu (1997)]. In both cases, workers receive less
than their marginal product from (general) training on average which improves ﬁrms’
investment incentives. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) note further labor market imper-
fections where wages are below marginal product and rise less steeply than productivity
so that the wedge between marginal product and (outside) wage is higher, the more
trained a worker is.25 A similar mechanism is at work in our framework:although
external wages are equal to worker’s marginal product from general training, the wage
he obtains if he stays with the training ﬁrm rises by less than his overall productivity.
Furthermore, the resulting gap is an increasing function of his level of speciﬁc training.
Although this property of our model is generated by the outcome of wage bargaining as
formalized in Assumption 3, it does not critically depend on the utilization of the outside
option principle. Implicit in this particular bargaining solution is the assumption that
the default payoﬀ each party receives in the course of bargaining is zero or, more
importantly, independent of investments. In other words, the default payoﬀs in case of
a disagreement during negotiations are unaﬀected by what the parties’ can obtain on
the external market. To consider the opposite polar case, suppose the worker’s default
23Note that our model is formally equivalent to the Becker’s framework and yields identical predic-
tions for s ≡ 0a n dg ≡ 0, respectively.
24See Katz and Zidermann (1990), Chiang and Chiang (1990), Chang and Wang (1996), and Ace-
moglu and Pischke (1998). For an analysis of what long-term (apprenticeship) contracts can achieve
in this context, see Malcomson et al. (1999).
25Apart from informational asymmetries, the authors study three situations where such a ‘com-
pressed’ wage structure is likely to arise: union wage setting, minimum wages, and worker moral
hazard.
20payoﬀ is identical to what he could obtain if he were to quit permanently, i.e., equal
to wE. Then, the gain from reaching an agreement would no longer be v2(s,g,θ) but
rather v2(s,g,θ) − wE = vS(s,θ) and would thus be unaﬀected by general training
outlays g. If the parties share this gain according to their relative bargaining powers,
equilibrium payoﬀs would be u∗
2 = wE + αvS(·)a n dπ∗
2 =( 1− α)vS(·). As the latter is
independent of g, the ﬁrm would have no incentive to invest in general skills.26 To assess
this, notice that for the employee’s threat point to be wE,h em u s tb ea b l et ot a k eo n
a temporary job for one bargaining round that pays the same wage wE as a permanent
job on the external labor market. Indeed, one can formalize the notions of alternative
market opportunities acting a threat points (in the sense of Nash-bargaining) and as
outside options as two limit cases of a non-cooperative alternating oﬀers game. In the
former case, the minimum time period for which the worker has to stick to an outside
employer is one bargaining round whereas it approaches inﬁnitely many rounds in the
latter [see Chiu and Yang (1999)].27 As we have seen above, our results are not valid
when the employee can switch to an outside employer and return after only one round of
bargaining. For all intermediate cases, however, the worker’s disagreement payoﬀ does
not rise one-to-one with his external market opportunity and our analysis continues to
apply. More generally, what matters qualitatively is that negotiations do not follow
exactly the Nash-solution, where the worker’s threat point (and his ﬁnal payoﬀ from
bargaining in our formulation) rises one-to-one with his outside option. This condition
is testable and appears to be satisﬁed in practice [see, e.g., Binmore, Shaked and Sutton
(1989), Knez and Camerer (1995) and Kahn and Murnighan (1993) for experimental
evidence and Scaramozzino (1991) for econometrical evidence in a study of the UK
manufacturing industry].
On the empirical side, our approach has a number of implications that are similar to
those of the existing literature. For example, since equilibrium turnover is lower the
26Formally, the additively separable structure of marginal products would be fully reﬂected in the
worker’s post-training wage. There would be no interaction between the two types of skills and Becker’s
original argument would fully carry over to a situation where both general and speciﬁc training is
provided.
27In this case, the external market opportunity, if taken terminates the relationship and must be
represented as an outside option. Alternatively, the distinction can be made based on search or
relocation costs that are associated with ﬁnding an equally good job outside the current relationship.
The worker will optimally bear those only if the new job is expected to last for some time. In particular,
as the time spent in negotiations (the time interval between oﬀers) becomes very small, such turnover
costs - even if they are arbitrarily low - are worth incurring only if the outside job is permanent. See
Malcomson (1997) for the same argument and a further discussion along those lines.
21higher the level of ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills, one would expect lower turnover rates in industries
where speciﬁc investments are very viable. The complementarity result in Proposition
3 then implies a negative correlation between both types of training and equilibrium
turnover although low turnover rates per se do not improve a ﬁrm’s incentives to provide
general training as has sometimes been suggested [Blinder and Krueger (1996)]. By the
same token, since the equilibrium level of general training in our model depends (among
other things) on its contractibility, the model predicts that both general and speciﬁc
training are higher in countries where institutionalized training programs make the
amount of general training more easily enforceable. If one reasonably presumes that
this is the case for, e.g., Germany relative to the United States, our results suggest that
there should also be more speciﬁc training and, hence, lower turnover rates in Germany
than in the United States. Finally, surplus sharing implies that the post-training wage
increases by less than a worker’s productivity.
All those predictions are supported by the data28 and although they stand in contrast
to the classical theory (where turnover should be independent of the level of general
training and wages should grow at the same rate as productivity), they are also implied
by, e.g., models that rely on informational asymmetries to explain ﬁrm-sponsored gen-
eral training.29 Let us therefore next discuss some empirical ﬁndings that are diﬃcult
to reconcile with the existing literature but may be accounted for by the interaction of
general and speciﬁc training.
First, supporting evidence for the present model may lie in the signiﬁcant diﬀerences
28The positive correlation between general training and retention rates is reported, e.g., in Blinder
and Krueger (1986). Topel and Ward (1992) and Soskice (1994) ﬁnd that the average number of jobs
held by US employees during the ﬁrst ten years of their career is about ﬁve, but only one or two in
Germany. Blanchﬂower, Oswald and Sanfrey (1996) ﬁnd that an increase in proﬁt per worker raises
wages only at a rate of at most 0.3 and Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) estimate that a worker’s
return on employer-sponsored speciﬁc and general training is very similar, suggesting that surplus-
sharing between ﬁrm and employer is prevalent.
29Asymmetric information is certainly a relevant phenomenon, although perhaps less so in countries
with formal training programs like Germany where apprentices receive upon completion a nation-
wide accepted certiﬁcate which acknowledges their skill and overall training success. The certiﬁcate
should reduce uncertainty in particular with respect to the amount of training received. In contrast,
the unknown characteristic in Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) is the ability of the apprentice of which
standardized exams may provide only a very noisy signal. Also, their empirical test supports the
presence of adverse selection, because the salaries of employees that leave because they are drafted
to the military (quits caused by exogenous reasons) are signiﬁcantly higher that the salaries of those
that either leave voluntarily or have been laid oﬀ. Our model cannot adequately account for these
diﬀerences, which emphasizes the importance of adverse selection phenomena as a complementary
explanation for the prevalence of general training.
22in training expenses across sectors of the German economy. Franz and Soskice (1995)
estimate the average yearly net training cost per apprentice at about DM 15000 in the
industrial sector which largely consists of medium and large scale enterprises, and at
only about DM 7000 per worker in the crafts and artisan sector (“Handwerk”). Similar
results are found in von Bardeleben, Beicht and Feher (1995) who estimate that large
ﬁrms with more than 500 employees have positive net training costs of about DM 7500
per employee, while the costs for the smallest ﬁrms with less than 10 employees [usually
from the Handwerk sector] are close to zero or may even be negative.
These patterns are somewhat surprising because the formal structure of apprenticeship
programs in the two sectors is more or less the same, and it is not immediate why in-
formational asymmetries or search costs should systematically diﬀer between industrial
and crafts sector. However, it seems quite plausible that ﬁrm-speciﬁc training is of con-
siderable importance in large enterprises which are characterized by complex internal
structures. In fact, Franz and Soskice (1995, p.220) note that “[...] in Germany, the
requirements of a skilled worker [in the industrial sector] have radically changed. By
contrast to the traditional craftsman or to a tradesman in a Fordist company who had a
set of standardized skills which they could use in many diﬀerent environments, the mod-
ern skilled employee plays a complex interactive role in the production, maintenance,
organization of new processes, and so on.” In light or our ﬁndings, the diﬀerences in
employer-sponsored training between the industrial and the crafts sector of the German
economy may thus be traced back to the diﬀerences in the viability of speciﬁc training.
This view is conﬁrmed by the observation that retention rates after the completion
of the apprenticeship program vary signiﬁcantly with ﬁrm size:Soskice (1994) reports
that the retention rates in small German ﬁrms with 5-9 employees are about 0.56, while
they increase in ﬁrm size and reach a rate of 0.87 for companies with more than 1000
employees. This sample also exhibits a relation between the employer’s willingness to
invest in general training and ﬁrm size:while about 41 percent of ﬁrms of less than 50
employees (and even 65 percent of ﬁrms with 5-9 workers) do not participate in for-
mal training programs which are general to a large degree, the fraction of non-training
ﬁrms continuously shrinks and becomes negligible for ﬁrms with more than 500 em-
ployees. This ﬁnding is in line with our theoretical results, where a high relevance of
speciﬁc training leads not only to low turnover rates, but goes hand in hand with a
more pronounced provision of ﬁrm-sponsored general training.
Second, recall from Section 2.3. that the model predicts the usage of breach penalties
23as an instrument for ﬁrms to protect their training outlays. Although breach penalties
drive a wedge between a worker’s marginal product and his outside market oppor-
tunities, the diﬀerence is independent of the amount of training received. In existing
models, therefore, penalty payments should have no eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s incentive to train,
irrespective of whether or not further market imperfections are present.30 As discussed
above, such clauses are frequently subject to legal restrictions. Nevertheless, they ex-
ist in reality. One example is the German revenue service which trains students in a
three-year trainee program who later serve as tax oﬃcials. If graduates quit the service
within ﬁve years after completion of the program, they are subject to a breach penalty
of about DM 25000. Similar clauses are used by German mining companies that provide
advanced training programs in engineering. Also observe that the use of vested stock
as part of an employee’s compensation package may serve as a substitute for explicit
breach penalties if those are diﬃcult to enforce.31
Finally, our analysis can account for the fact that employers frequently sponsor general
training of their employees only simultaneously with or after a period of in-house train-
ing.32 If in-house training is partly relationship-speciﬁc, it may take some time until
a worker’s speciﬁc skills generate suﬃcient additional surplus until his outside wage
falls short of the negotiated equilibrium wage inside the current relationship which is
a prerequisite for general training to be viable. Expressed diﬀerently, if general in-
vestments would be provided prior to the speciﬁc training, outside employers could
poach the worker upon completion of the general training period, and then train him in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills themselves. In such a situation, the ﬁrm recovers no return from gen-
eral investments in the ﬁrst period, and would rationally postpone its participation in
30The eﬀectiveness of breach penalties hinges on the presumption that bargaining follows the outside
option principle. It is important to note that they cannot serve this purpose if external market
opportunities act as threat points rather than outside options.
31We thank George Baker for pointing this out to us.
32Yu (1999) conducts a survey of evening MBA students at the HAAS business school at UC Berkeley.
About 80 percent of the students had partial to full tuition (which amounts to $ 19.000-$24.000
annually) paid for by the companies for which they work. He ﬁnds that the number of years an
employee had worked for the company (as a proxy for the amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc training the worker
has acquired) has a signiﬁcant positive impact on the percentage of ﬁrm-sponsored education. Likewise,
large consulting ﬁrms such as McKinsey and Co. generally oﬀer employees with two of more years of
job tenure the possibility to take a paid leave in order to participate in MBA programs or complete
their doctoral degrees. Importantly, the corresponding contract is signed at the beginning of the
employment relationship, i.e., at a time where the company presumably has no more information on
the employee’s ability than other ﬁrms. Of course, such oﬀers may also serve as screening devices in
recruitment. This alternative explanation, however, cannot account for the the contractually speciﬁed
time sequence.
24general training until a suﬃcient level of speciﬁc human capital has been accumulated.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied a situation where the ﬁrm can invest in general as well as
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital of its employees. Our main result was that these types of
investments interact even if no technological link exists. Speciﬁcally, speciﬁc training
not only renders the provision of general training viable for an employer, but the reverse
also holds:the higher the level of a worker’s general human capital, the larger are the
ﬁrm’s incentives to train him in speciﬁc skills. The ﬁnding therefore indicates that
speciﬁc and general training are ‘incentive’ complements from the employer’s point of
view. As a consequence, employers may be willing to sponsor general training even in
competitive labor markets where outside wages fully reﬂect a worker’s marginal product
from his general human capital.
We have argued that there is not only evidence that ﬁrms sponsor general human capital
accumulation of their workers, but also evidence that suggests the complementarity in
the provision of general and speciﬁc training. Whether this complementarity can mainly
be attributed to technological reasons or to the interaction we posit in the present paper
is an empirical question which future research needs to address. We should emphasize,
though, that our model does not preclude the possibility of a technological link between
both types of training, be it on the output or on the cost side of production. The positive
incentive eﬀect that we have isolated in our analysis should be present irrespective of
whether general and speciﬁc training are technological complements or substitutes.
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
By deﬁnition, E[π(s,g)] is supermodular in (s,g)i fa n do n l yi f∂E[π(s,g )]/∂s ≥
∂E[π(s,g)]/∂s for all s and g  >g . Using (6), this condition is equivalent to











where Θ  ≡ Θ(s,g )a n dΘ≡ Θ(s,g). Since g  >g⇒ vG(g ,θ) >v G(g,θ) for all values of θ,
we have θ ∈ Θ  ⇒ θ ∈ Θ ⇔ Θ  ⊆ Θ, which together with ∂vS(s∗,θ)/∂s > 0 implies (9). Also
observe that the inequality in (9) is strict whenever either Θ  = ∅ or Θ   =[ θ, ¯ θ]. ✷
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
The equilibrium contract (w∗
1,g∗) when g is contractible maximizes expected surplus S(g,s) ≡
Eθ [v2(s,g,θ)] + v1 − s − g subject to s = s∗(g)a n dE[π(s,g)] ≥ 0.
Suppose ﬁrst by way of contradiction that (8) is satisﬁed but g∗ ≤ gFB. Now consider a






















Note that by (3), the ﬁrst term in brackets is non-negative for any g∗ ≤ gFB. Likewise, under
condition (8), Θ(sFB,g∗) is non-empty for any g∗ ≤ gFB. (6) then implies s∗(g∗) <s FBso that
the second term is strictly positive. Furthermore, ∂s∗/∂g > 0 for Θ(s∗(g),g)  = ∅⇔s∗ <s FB
from the proof of Proposition 3. Thus, dS > 0, contradicting our presumption that g∗ ≤ gFB
is part of an equilibrium contract (an analogous argument can be applied to show that we
must have s∗ <s FB in equilibrium).
If we decompose w1 =¯ w1 − γg again, we ﬁnd using (1) and (5),






vS(s∗(g),θ)dF(θ) − s∗(g) >v 1







The corresponding value of γ can be obtained by evaluating (10) at g∗.S i n c e Θ ( s∗,g∗)i s
non-empty, we have γ<1.
Finally, suppose (8) is not satisﬁed, i.e., Θ(sFB,gFB)=∅. Together with (6), this implies
s∗(gFB)=sFB. Hence, the level of general training that maximizes S(s,g) subject to s =
s∗(g) is equal to gFB. The claim γ = 1 follows immediately from (10) and Θ(sFB,gFB)=∅
which completes the proof. ✷
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